Rationalizability and the savage axioms

Kin Chung Lo

Economic Theory, 2000, vol. 15, issue 3, 727-733

Abstract: Suppose there is a finite set of acts defined on a finite state space and a decision maker chooses an act from the set. In this setting, the subjective expected utility model is observationally indistinguishable from all models of preference that satisfy Savage's axiom P3. The result has implications also for rationalizability in strategic games.

Keywords: Revealed preference; Rationalizability; Expected utility; Ellsberg Paradox. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-04-13
Note: Received: September 18, 1998; revised version: January 29, 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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