Demand bargaining in legislatures

Daniel Cardona and Francisco M. Mancera
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Francisco M. Mancera: Departamento de EconomÎa e H. EconÕmica, Universidad de MÂlaga, 29071 MÂlaga, SPAIN

Economic Theory, 2000, vol. 16, issue 1, 163-180

Abstract: We analyze a pure bargaining problem when decisions require simple majority and self interested players make unilateral demands. In contrast to the case where proposals consist of complete sharing profiles, this content of proposals prevents implicit side-payments inside the committee, and so non-discriminatory outcomes might be expected. We show that in some settings this is the case and the surplus is universally shared.

Keywords: Bargaining; Coalition formation; Majority voting; Non-cooperative games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-04-14
Note: Received: October 12, 1998; revised version: July 1, 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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