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The stand-alone test and decreasing serial cost sharing

Jens Hougaard () and Lars Thorlund-Petersen
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Lars Thorlund-Petersen: Copenhagen Business School, Department of Operations Management, Solbjerg Pl. 3, 2000 Frederiksberg, DENMARK

Economic Theory, 2000, vol. 16, issue 2, 355-362

Abstract: The rule of decreasing serial cost sharing defined in de Frutos [1] over the class of concave cost functions may violate the important stand-alone test. Sufficient conditions for the test to be satisfied are given, in terms of individual rationality as well as coalitional stability. These conditions restrict the shape of the cost function and the distribution of demands.

Keywords: Serial cost sharing; The stand-alone test; The core. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D63 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-07-14
Note: Received: July 29, 1999; revised version: October 4, 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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