On games with identical equilibrium payoffs

Indrajit Ray ()

Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 17, issue 1, 223-231

Abstract: This paper compares the sets of Nash, coalition- proof Nash and strong Nash equilibrium payoffs of normal form games which are closely related. We propose sufficient conditions for equivalent or closely related games to have identical sets of equilibrium payoffs.

Keywords: Payoff equivalence; Strong Nash equilibrium; Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; Correlation device. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-11-14
Note: Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: November 23, 1999
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