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Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: the core

Konstantinos Serfes ()

Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 18, issue 2, 333-348

Abstract: We study the process of learning in a differential information economy, with a continuum of states of nature that follow a Markov process. The economy extends over an infinite number of periods and we assume that the agents behave non-myopically, i.e., they discount the future. We adopt a new equilibrium concept, the non-myopic core. A realized agreement in each period generates information that changes the underlying structure in the economy. The results we obtain serve as an extension to the results in Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1999) in a setting where agents behave non-myopically. In particular, we examine the following two questions: 1) If we have a sequence of allocations that are in an approximate non-myopic core (we allow for bounded rationality), is it possible to find a subsequence that converges to a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full information economy? 2) Given a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full information economy can we find a sequence of approximate non-myopic core allocations that converges to that allocation?

Keywords: Non-myopic learning; Differential information; Core. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-05-08
Note: Received: May 25, 1999; revised version: August 9, 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Chapter: Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: the core (2005)
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