symposium articles: Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection

Douglas Gale ()

Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 18, issue 2, 414 pages

Abstract: The paper analyzes an economy with two-sided adverse selection, focusing on equilibria that satisfy a refinement based on the notion of strategic stability. In the familiar case of one-sided adverse selection, agents reveal all of their private information as long as the contract space is rich enough. However, with two-sided adverse selection, the sufficient conditions for separation are much stronger.

Keywords: Signaling; Adverse selection; Markets; Rationing; Types; Equilibrium; Refinement; Strategic stability; Walrasian. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D5 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-05-08
Note: Received: September 3, 1999; revised version: December 3, 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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