Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies

Nicholas C. Yannelis () and Guangsug Hahn ()
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Nicholas C. Yannelis: Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,Champaign, IL 61820, USA
Guangsug Hahn: Korea Economic Research Institute, Seoul, 150-756 KOREA

Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 18, issue 2, 485-509

Abstract: A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is interim individually rational, interim efficient, coalitional B ayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable.

Keywords: Implementation; Differential information; Cooperative games; Incentive compatibility; Interim private core; Interim private value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-05-08
Note: Received: January 12, 1998; revised version: March 30, 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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