A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution

Herve Moulin and Anna Bogomolnaia

Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 19, issue 3, 623-636

Abstract: All agents have the same ordinal ranking over all objects, receiving no object (opting out) may be preferable to some objects, agents differ on which objects are worse than opting out, and the latter information is private. The Probabilistic Serial assignment, improves upon (in the Pareto sense) the Random Priority assignment, that randomly orders the agents and offers them successively the most valuable remaining object. We characterize Probabilistic Serial by efficiency in an ordinal sense, and envy-freeness. We characterize it also by ordinal efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals.

Keywords: Random assignment; No Envy; Strategyproofness; Priority. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12-20
Note: Received: October 5, 1999; revised version: December 20, 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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