A new look for Stackelberg-Cournot equilibria in oligopolistic markets

Jacqueline Morgan, Lina Mallozzi () and Sjur Flåm
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Lina Mallozzi: Dipartimento di Matematica e Applicazioni, Università di Napoli Federico II, V. Claudio, 21, 80125 Napoli, ITALY

Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 20, issue 1, 183-188

Abstract: This note deals with Cournot type oligopolies in which the market clearing price occasionally may be non-unique. A Stackelberg leading producer is present. Given that setting we explore continuity properties of the followers' reaction and provide sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium.

Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; Stackelberg solutions; Nash equilibrium; closed correspondences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-02-20
Note: Received: June 20, 2000; revised version: April 24, 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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