Revisiting Savage in a conditional world

Paolo Ghirardato

Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 20, issue 1, 83-92

Abstract: I present an axiomatization of subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating in a conditional decision problem. This result improves our understanding of the Bayesian standard from two perspectives: 1) it uses a set of axioms which are weak and intuitive; 2) it provides a formal proof to results on the relation between dynamic consistency, expected utility and Bayesian updating which have never been explicitly proved in a fully subjective framework.

Keywords: Subjective expected utility; Bayes's rule; Dynamic consistency; Consequentialism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-02-20
Note: Received: December 1, 2000; revised version: February 26, 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (146)

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