Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers

Chen-Ying Huang ()
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Chen-Ying Huang: Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, 21 Hsu-Chow Road, Taipei, TAIWAN

Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 20, issue 2, 412 pages

Abstract: We present a game in which n persons split a cake, where a distinction between conditional and unconditional offers is made. This distinction sheds light on the contrasting results obtained in the previous literature of multilateral bargaining. By allowing the proposer to make both conditional and unconditional offers, we show that the game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.

Keywords: Bargaining; Conditional and unconditional offers. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-02-26
Note: Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: March 13, 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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