Preference profiles sustaining Arrow's theorem

Antonio Quesada

Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 20, issue 3, 623-627

Abstract: Arrow's theorem is proved on a domain consisting of two types of preference profiles. Those in the first type are "almost unanimous": for every profile some alternative x is such that the preferences of any two individuals merely differ in the ranking of x, which is in one of the first three positions. Profiles of the second type are "appropriately heterogeneous", with preferences similar to those generating the "paradox of voting".

Keywords: Arrow's theorem; Domain restriction; Paradox of voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-21
Note: Received: March 9, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001
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