Allocating multiple units

Kala Krishna () and Torben Tranæ S
Additional contact information
Torben Tranæ S: Institute of Economics, CIE, and EPRU, University of Copenhagen, 1455 Copenhagen, DENMARK
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Torben Tranaes ()

Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 20, issue 4, 733-750

Abstract: This paper studies the allocation and rent distribution in multi-unit, combinatorial-bid auctions under complete information. We focus on the natural multi-unit analogue of the first-price auction, where buyers bid total payments, pay their bids, and where the seller allocates goods to maximize his revenue. While there are many equilibria in this auction, only efficient equilibria remain when the truthful equilibrium restriction of the menu-auction literature is used. Focusing on these equilibria we first show that the first-price auction just described is revenue and outcome equivalent to a Vickrey auction, which is the multi unit analogue of a second-price auction. Furthermore, we characterize these equilibria when valuations take a number of different forms: diminishing marginal valuations, increasing average valuations, and marginal valuations with single turning points.

Keywords: Menu auctions; Multiple-unit auctions; First-price vs. second-price auctions; Revenue equivalence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-21
Note: Received: December 23, 1999; revised version: December 10, 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/2020004/20200733.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:20:y:2002:i:4:p:733-750

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().