Core rationalizability in two-agent exchange economies
Walter Bossert and
Yves Sprumont ()
Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 20, issue 4, 777-791
Abstract:
We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given endowment vector. The approach followed in this paper deviates from the standard rational choice model in that a rationalization in terms of a profile of individual orderings rather than in terms of a single individual or social preference relation is analyzed.
Keywords: Collective rationality; Cores; Exchange economies. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-21
Note: Received: April 20, 2000; revised version: September 25, 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Core Rationalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies (2000) 
Working Paper: Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies (2000) 
Working Paper: Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies (2000)
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