A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures

Jerry S. Kelly and Donald E. Campbell ()
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Jerry S. Kelly: Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13245-1090, USA
Donald E. Campbell: Department of Economics and The Program in Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA

Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 20, issue 4, 809-829

Abstract: We characterize strategy-proof social choice procedures when choice sets need not be singletons. Sets are compared by leximin. For a strategy-proof rule g, there is a positive integer k such that either (i) the choice sets g(r) for all profiles r have the same cardinality k and there is an individual i such that g(r) is the set of alternatives that are the k highest ranking in i's preference ordering, or (ii) all sets of cardinality 1 to k are chosen and there is a coalition L of cardinality k such that g(r) is the union of the tops for the individuals in L. There do not exist any strategy-proof rules such that the choice sets are all of cardinality $k^*$ to k where $1

Keywords: Leximin; Non-resolute; Strategy-proof. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-21
Note: Received: November 8, 1999; revised version: September 18, 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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