Nash implementation with a private good

John Duggan

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 21, issue 1, 117-131

Abstract: I construct a general model of social planning problems, including mixed production economies and regulatory problems with negative externalities as special cases, and I give simple mechanisms for Nash implementation under three increasingly general sets of assumptions. I first construct a continuous mechanism to implement the (constrained) Lindahl allocations of an economy, and I then extend this to arbitrary social choice rules based on prices. I end with a mechani sm to implement any monotonic social choice rule, assuming only the existence of a private (not necessarily transferable) good. In that general case, each agent simply reports an upper contour set, an outcome, and I need two agents to make binary numerical announcements. I do not require the usual no-veto-power condition. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Nash implementation; Lindahl equilibrium; Walrasian equilibrium; Simple mechanisms.; JEL Classification Numbers: D78. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0262-2

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