Information at equilibrium

Enrico Minelli and H. Polemarchakis

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 21, issue 2, 573-584

Abstract: In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric: the same profile of strategies is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information; and strategies are common knowledge. If each player has a veto act, which yields a minimum payoff that no other profile of strategies attains, then the veto profile is the only Nash equilibrium, and it is is an equilibrium with rational expectations and essentially symmetric information; which accounts for the impossibility of speculation. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Nash equilibrium; Rational expectations; Common knowledge.; JEL Classification Numbers: D82. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Information at equilibrium (2000)
Working Paper: Information at equilibrium (2000)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0260-4

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