Non-cooperative games with a continuum of players whose payoffs depend on summary statistics

Michael Rauh ()

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 21, issue 4, 906 pages

Abstract: We consider static non-cooperative games with a continuum of small players whose payoffs depend on their own actions and finitely many summary statistics of the aggregate strategy profile. We prove the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies without any convexity restrictions on payoffs or the common action space. We show that this result applies to a broad class of monopolistic competition models. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Large games; Summary statistics; Monopolistic competition.; JEL Classification Numbers: C72; D43. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-001-0252-9

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