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Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions

Effrosyni Diamantoudi ()

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 22, issue 2, 446 pages

Abstract: This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The emphasis, however, is placed on situations with multiple outcomes and how agents behave in the presence of such multiplicity. In particular, a deviating coalition considers all the likely outcomes that may prevail upon its deviation, and selects (if possible) a subset of them. Three augmentations of Ray and Vohra's [3] solution concept are defined, capturing three distinct behavioral assumptions. Efficiency of and the relation between the three notions are discussed. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases:Coalition structures; Binding agreements; Stability.; JEL Classification Numbers:C70; C71. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Equilibrium Binding Agreements under Diverse Bahavioral Assumptions Downloads
Working Paper: Equilibrium Binding Agreements under Diverse Bahavioral Assumptions Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0301-z

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