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Endogenous market segmentation with heterogeneous agents

Gautam Bose

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 22, issue 2, 457-467

Abstract: An explanation is provided for the evolution of segmented marketplaces in a pairwise exchange economy. Large traders operating in a pairwise exchange market prefer to meet other similar traders, because this enables them to trade their endowments in a smaller number of encounters. Large and small traders, however, cannot be distinguished a priori, and the existence of the small traders imposes a negative externality on the large traders. We show that, under conditions which are not very restrictive, establishing a separate market (perhaps with an entry fee) designated for the large traders induces the two types of traders to segment themselves. However, this segmentation is not necessarily welfare improving. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases:Market segmentation; Intermediation; Heterogeneous agents.; JEL Classification Numbers:D40; G20. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0319-2

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