A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule

Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 22, issue 3, 557-568

Abstract: A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let (resp., denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain , and majority rule is the only strategy-proof rule with domain . Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Condorcet; Majority winner; Strategy-proof.; JEL Classification Numbers: D70; D71. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-002-0344-1 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:22:y:2003:i:3:p:557-568

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0344-1

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().