Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions

Oleksii Birulin

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 22, issue 3, 675-683

Abstract: I consider a single-object English auction with two asymmetric bidders and show that it has a continuum of inefficient undominated ex-post equilibria. The result extends for the generalized VCG mechanism, Dasgupta-Maskin auction and, generally, for every auction that has an efficient ex-post equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Auction; VCG mechnism; Ex-post equilibrium; Efficiency.; JEL Classification Numbers: D44. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0317-4

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