The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice

Federico Echenique

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 22, issue 4, 903-905

Abstract: I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice of the joint strategy space. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Supermodular games; Strategic complementarities; Tarski's fixed point theorem; Lattice.; JEL Classification Numbers: C62; C72. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0337-0

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