Are incomplete markets able to achieve minimal efficiency?
Egbert Dierker,
Hildegard Dierker and
Birgit Grodal
Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 25, issue 1, 75-87
Abstract:
We consider economies with incomplete markets, one good per state, two periods, t=0,1, private ownership of initial endowments, a single firm, and no assets other than shares in this firm. In Dierker, Dierker, Grodal (2002), we give an example of such an economy in which all market equilibria are constrained inefficient. In this paper, we weaken the concept of constrained efficiency by taking away the planner’s right to determine consumers’ investments. An allocation is called minimally constrained efficient if a planner, who can only determine the production plan and the distribution of consumption at t=0, cannot find a Pareto improvement. We present an example with arbitrarily small income effects in which no market equilibrium is minimally constrained efficient. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
Keywords: Incomplete markets with production; Constrained efficiency; Dréze equilibria. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Are Incomplete Markets Able to Achieve Minimal Efficiency? (2002) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:25:y:2005:i:1:p:75-87
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0406-z
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