Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

Masaki Aoyagi

Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 25, issue 2, 455-475

Abstract: This paper studies repeated games with imperfect private monitoring when there exists a third-party mediator who coordinates play by giving non-binding instructions to players on which action to take and by collecting their private information. The paper presents a Nash-threat folk theorem for a communication equilibrium based on such mediation when monitoring is jointly $\epsilon$ -perfect in the sense that every player is almost perfectly monitored collectively by other players. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Repeated games; Private monitoring; Joint monitoring; Communication; Mediation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0436-6

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