A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solution with coalition structure

Juan Vidal-Puga

Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 25, issue 3, 679-701

Abstract: The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for non-transferable utility (NTU) games is generalized so that a coalition structure among players is taken into account. The new mechanism yields the Owen value for transferable utility (TU) games with coalition structure as well as the consistent value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992) for NTU games with trivial coalition structure. Furthermore, we obtain a solution for pure bargaining problems with coalition structure which generalizes the Nash (1950) bargaining solution. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Bargaining; NTU game; Coalition structure; Owen value; Nash solution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0446-4

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