Procedurally fair and stable matching

Bettina Klaus () and Flip Klijn

Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 27, issue 2, 447 pages

Abstract: We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al. , 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and “endstate” fairness. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Keywords: Procedural fairness; Random mechanism; Stability; Two-sided matching. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching (2015)
Working Paper: Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching (2003)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0602-5

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