Subbalanced games and bargaining sets

Chih Chang (cchang@am.nthu.edu.tw) and Peng-An Chen (pengan@nuk.edu.tw)

Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 27, issue 3, 643-656

Abstract: In defining a bargaining set, it is desirable to require that a counterobjecting coalition has a non-empty intersection with the objecting coalition. We refer to this as the intersection property and define a bargaining set, MB 1 , that imposes this property on a variant of the bargaining set defined by Vohra (1991). To study the existence of MB 1 , a new version of the KKM theorem is proposed and the concept of a subbalanced game is introduced. We also provide conditions for the non-emptiness of MB 2 , a bargaining set introduced by Zhou (1994) which imposes the additional restriction that the objecting coalition not be a subset of the counterobjecting coalition. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Keywords: NTU games; Bargaining set; Subbalancedness; KKM theorem. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0592-3

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