Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions

David Malueg () and Andrew Yates

Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 27, issue 3, 719-727

Abstract: We characterize pure-strategy Nash equilibria for symmetric rent-seeking contests in which the contest success function is homogeneous of degree zero. The equilibrium strategies have a simple form. We give sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Keywords: Rent-seeking; Homogeneous contest success functions; Existence of equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0554-9

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