Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games

Tasos Kalandrakis

Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 28, issue 2, 309-329

Abstract: We develop an index theory for the Stationary Subgame Perfect (SSP) equilibrium set in a class of n-player $(n\ge 2)$ sequential bargaining games with probabilistic recognition rules. For games with oligarchic voting rules (a class that includes unanimity rule), we establish conditions on individual utilities that ensure that for almost all discount factors, the number of SSP equilibria is odd and the equilibrium correspondence lower-hemicontinuous. For games with general, monotonic voting rules, we show generic (in discount factors) determinacy of SSP equilibria under the restriction that the agreement space is of dimension one. For non-oligarchic voting rules and agreement spaces of higher finite dimension, we establish generic determinacy for the subset of SSP equilibria in pure strategies. The analysis also extends to the case of fixed delay costs. Lastly, we provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness of SSP equilibrium in oligarchic games. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Keywords: Local uniqueness of equilibrium; Regularity; Sequential bargaining. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-005-0620-y (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Regularity of Pure Strategy Equilibrium Points in a Class of Bargaining Games (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:28:y:2006:i:2:p:309-329

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0620-y

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().