The effects of information on strategic investment and welfare
Jacco Thijssen,
Kuno Huisman and
Peter Kort
Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 28, issue 2, 399-424
Abstract:
The paper analyses the influence of uncertainty and competition on the strategic considerations of a firm’s investment decision, where the firm receives imperfect signals about the profitability of an investment project. We find a preemptive or an attrition equilibrium depending on a trade-off between first and second mover advantages. We show that welfare can be negatively affected by decreasing uncertainty, i.e. more and/or better information. Furthermore, simulations indicate that duopoly leads to higher welfare than monopoly if there are few and relatively non-informative signals, whereas the opposite holds if there are many and relatively informative signals. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006
Keywords: Uncertainty; Strategic investment; Imperfect information; Welfare. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)
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Working Paper: The Effects of Information on Strategic Investment and Welfare (2003) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:28:y:2006:i:2:p:399-424
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0628-3
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