A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result

Rene Kirkegaard

Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 28, issue 2, 449-452

Abstract: Bulow and Klemperer [1] have provided an upper bound on the value of bargaining power for a seller of an indivisible object. Specifically, negotiating optimally with N buyers yields lower revenue than an English auction with N + 1 buyers. In this paper, a short and intuitive proof of this result is presented. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Keywords: Auctions; Negotiations; Rationing. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0593-2

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