Message spaces for perfect correlated equilibria

Shurojit Chatterji and Srihari Govindan

Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 28, issue 2, 475-479

Abstract: We show that a perfect correlated equilibrium distribution of an N-person game, as defined by Dhillon and Mertens (1996) can be achieved using a finite number of copies of the strategy space as the message space. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; Perfection; Hierarchy of beliefs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Message Spaces for Perfect Correlated Equilibria (2002)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0630-9

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