The Borda Method Is Most Likely to Respect the Condorcet Principle

Jill Van Newenhizen

Economic Theory, 1992, vol. 2, issue 1, 69-83

Abstract: We prove that in the class of weighted voting systems the Borda Count maximizes the probability that a Condorcet candidate is ranked first in a group election. A direct result is that the Borda Count maximizes the probability that a transitive, binary ranking of the candidates is preserved in a group election. A preliminary result, but one of independent interest, is that the Borda Count maximizes the probability that a majority outcome between any two candidates is reflected by the group election. All theorems are valid when there is a uniform probability distribution on the voter profiles and can be generalized to other "uniform-like" probability distributions. This work extends previous results of Fishburn and Gehrlein from three candidates to any number of candidates.

Date: 1992
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