On ‘Informationally Robust Equilibria’ for Bimatrix Games
Hans Reijnierse (),
Peter Borm and
Mark Voorneveld
Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 30, issue 3, 539-560
Keywords: Bimatrix game; Equilibrium selection; Leakage of information; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0076-0
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