Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction

Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 31, issue 3, 473-488

Keywords: Auctions; Surplus extraction; Interdependent valuations; Mechanism design; D44; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-006-0104-8 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:31:y:2007:i:3:p:473-488

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0104-8

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().