On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships

Frank Gigler () and Thomas Hemmer ()

Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 37, issue 2, 243-265

Keywords: Principal–agent problem; Limited versus unlimited renegotiations; Value of limiting commitment; C70; D82; D83; D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0292-x

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