A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games

Bertrand Tchantcho () and Lawrence Diffo Lambo ()

Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 37, issue 3, 533-542

Keywords: Simple game; Social choice correspondence; Implementation; Core; Simple game; C62; C70; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0317-5

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