Auctions with costly information acquisition
Jacques Crémer (),
Yossi Spiegel () and
Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 38, issue 1, 72 pages
Keywords: Auctions; Mechanism design; Groves; Adverse selection; Costly information; D44; D82; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition (2007)
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