Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good

Martin Hellwig

Economic Theory, 2010, vol. 44, issue 3, 397 pages

Keywords: Utilitarian welfare maximization; Admission rules for excludable public goods; Randomization in optimal mechanisms; D61; D63; H21; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0488-3

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