Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale

Harrison Cheng () and Guofu Tan

Economic Theory, 2010, vol. 45, issue 1, 253-290

Keywords: Common-value auctions; Private-value auctions; Resale; Revenue ranking; Regularity condition; Submodularity; Supermodularity; Single-crossing condition; D4; D8; L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0505-6

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