EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

An Experimental Examination into the Design of Decentralized Methods to Solve the Assignment Problem with and without Money

Mark Olson and David Porter

Economic Theory, 1994, vol. 4, issue 1, 40 pages

Abstract: An experimental examination of the assignment problem, matching individuals to positions or slots, is conducted in which various assignment mechanisms are analyzed. Generalized versions of both the Vicrey and English auctions are designed to solve the assignment problem along with ordinal ranking mechanisms (serial dictator and "funny" money system). The generalized auctions result in efficient allocations. In contrast, the ordinal ranking mechanisms, which require no monetary transfers, are significantly less efficient in their assignments. However, the efficient allocations obtained from the competitive bidding processes are at the expense of consumers' surplus since demanders retain significantly larger profits with the ordinal ranking mechanisms.

Date: 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:4:y:1994:i:1:p:11-40

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2020-04-24
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:4:y:1994:i:1:p:11-40