The Demand Commitment Bargaining and Snowballing Cooperation

Eyal Winter ()

Economic Theory, 1994, vol. 4, issue 2, 255-73

Abstract: A multi-person bargaining model based on sequential demands is studied for coalitional games with increasing returns to scale for cooperation. We show that for such games, the (subgame perfect) equilibrium behavior leads to a payoff distribution which approaches the Shapley value as the money unit approaches 0. Subgame consistency and strategic equilibria are the main tools used in the analysis. The model is then applied to study a problem of public good consumption.

Date: 1994
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