Measuring the Instability in Two-Sided Matching Procedures

Raymond Board

Economic Theory, 1994, vol. 4, issue 4, 77 pages

Abstract: Two-sided matching procedures are considered using the stable marriage model. There exist some matching procedures that, in spite of producing unstable matches, have nonetheless survived in practice; other such procedures have failed and been abandoned. The success or failure of these procedures may be linked to the amount of instability in the matchings they produce. We describe a way to measure the amount of instability likely to result from such algorithms and use it to analyze the performance of a particular matching procedure much like those used by the United States Naval Academy and the National Football League. We also consider how favorable the matchings are likely to be from the standpoint of the agents and examine how our results change when agents agree on some portion of their preference lists.

Date: 1994
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