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Strategies in the principal-agent model

James Mirrlees and Roberto Raimondo ()

Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 53, issue 3, 605-656

Abstract: In this paper, we study the principal-agent problem. It is well known that in continuous-time, it is possible to prove the existence of an equilibrium $$ (u^{*},S^{*})$$ in a considerably general setting, and however little is known about the strategies themselves. Our goal is to present a universal way to construct these strategies as limiting strategies of a very simple type. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Agency theory; Principal-agent problems; Incentive schemes; Brownian motion; D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0706-2

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