A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara ()

Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 54, issue 1, 151 pages

Abstract: The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo’s message space specification— $$s$$ -mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving ‘one less’ preference announcements breaks this equivalence relationship down. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Nash implementation; Strategy space reduction; $$s$$ -mechanisms; C72; D71; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction (2011)
Working Paper: A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction (2010)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2

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