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Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game

Timothy Cason, Sau-Him Lau and Vai-Lam Mui

Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 54, issue 2, 335-357

Abstract: History-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. Using the indefinitely repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, this paper reports novel evidence that players who have successfully used an efficiency-enhancing turn taking strategy will teach other players in subsequent supergames to adopt this strategy. We find that subjects engage in turn taking frequently in both the Low Conflict and the High Conflict treatments. Prior experience with turn taking significantly increases turn taking in both treatments. Moreover, successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. The comparative statics results show that teaching in such an environment also responds to incentives, since teaching is empirically more frequent in the Low Conflict treatment with higher benefits and lower costs. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Learning; Teaching; Assignment game; Laboratory experiment; Repeated games; Turn taking; Common-pool resources; C73; C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Working Paper: Learning, Teaching, and Turn Taking in the Repeated Assignment Game (2011) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0718-y

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