The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

Fuhito Kojima () and Utku Unver

Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 55, issue 3, 515-544

Abstract: The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce two new axioms; favoring higher ranks and rank-respecting invariance. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it favors higher ranks and satisfies consistency, resource monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance. In environments where each type of object has exactly one unit, as in house allocation, a characterization is given by favoring higher ranks, individual rationality, population monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Mechanism design; Matching; School choice; Market design; Boston mechanism; C78; D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-013-0769-8

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