EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The strategic sincerity of Approval voting

Matias Nuñez

Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 56, issue 1, 157-189

Abstract: We show that Approval voting need not trigger sincere behavior in equilibrium of Poisson voting games and hence might lead a strategic voter to skip a candidate preferred to his worst preferred approved candidate. We identify two main rationales for these violations of sincerity. First, if a candidate has no votes, a voter might skip him. Notwithstanding, we provide sufficient conditions on the voters’ preference intensities to remove this sort of insincerity. On the contrary, if the candidate gets a positive share of the votes, a voter might skip him solely on the basis of his ordinal preferences. This second type of insincerity is a consequence of the correlation of the candidates’ scores. The incentives for sincerity of rank scoring rules are also discussed. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Sincerity; Approval voting; Poisson games; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-013-0775-x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:56:y:2014:i:1:p:157-189

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-013-0775-x

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:56:y:2014:i:1:p:157-189