On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences

Murat Öztürk, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken ()

Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 56, issue 1, 83-108

Abstract: In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a polytope in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. A point $$x$$ x of the polytope is called single-best if there is a point $$y$$ y of the polytope such that $$x$$ x is the unique point of the polytope at maximal distance from $$y$$ y . It is proved that if the polytope does not have either exactly two single-best points or exactly four single-best points which form the vertices of a rectangle, then any Pareto optimal and strategy-proof rule is dictatorial. If the polytope has exactly two single-best points, then there are non-dictatorial strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules, which can be described by committee voting (simple games) between the two single-best points. This also holds if there are exactly four single-best points which form the vertices of a rectangle, but in that case, we limit ourselves to describing an example of such a rule. The framework under consideration models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Single-dipped preferences; Pareto optimality; Strategy-proofness; Committee voting; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-013-0785-8

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